I. Introduction
Academic economists differ widely in their views on the costs of disinflation, and nowhere are these differences exhibited more strikingly than in two essays, by Robert J. Gordon and Thomas J. Sargent, that appear back-toback in Robert E. Hall's 1982 volume, Inflation: Causes and Effects. In his essay, Gordon considers 14 historical episodes in the United States since 1916 and in eight other countries since the mid-1960s; data from these episodes lead him to conclude that deliberate monetary policy actions taken to reduce the inflation rate are almost always quite costly, resulting in significant short-run declines in aggregate output. Gordon's analysis also suggests that these output costs can be minimized, although still not avoided altogether, by a policy that brings inflation down only gradually.
Sargent, like Gordon, draws on data from historical episodes in which monetary authorities took deliberate actions to reduce inflation; he examines the ends of hyperinflations in four European countries during the 1920s.
Sargent finds that in each of these countries, Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Poland, inflation was brought to an abrupt halt with little or no loss in aggregate output. At first glance, therefore, Sargent's findings appear in stark contrast to Gordon's: they suggest that it is possible to end inflation quickly and costlessly. This paper attempts to reconcile Gordon and Sargent's disparate observations using a single theoretical model of inflation and disinflation.
The model's key feature, a fixed cost of price adjustment, makes firms unwilling to immediately reset their nominal prices following a small change in inflation. Most of the disinflationary episodes studied by Gordon began from moderate rates of inflation, and indeed, the end of a small inflation in the model presented here is accompanied by losses in aggregate output, although these losses are minimized when the disinflation is gradual. At the same time, however, firms incur the fixed cost to adjust their prices following a large change in inflation; big inflations, like those studied by Sargent, can be eliminated quickly with no loss in aggregate output.
Parts of this story appear elsewhere. Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988) , for instance, develop a model of costly price adjustment in which monetary shocks have larger effects on output at lower rates of inflation; the real effects of money tend to vanish as inflation rises. Because of the technical difficulties associated with solving models featuring fixed costs of price adjustment, however, previous studies have been unable to consider the full effects of large changes in policy, such as those required to implement a disinflation. Danziger (1988) , for example, addresses the problem of disinflation in a model of costly price adjustment, but confines his analysis to cases in which a small inflation is brought immediately to an end. He therefore stops short of answering the questions considered here: how does the cost of disinflation depend on the initial inflation rate, and how does it depend on the speed of disinflation?
Other studies of disinflation, including Phelps (1979) , Taylor (1983), and Fischer (1986) , work with models that constrain firms to use timedependent strategies, changing their nominal prices at intervals of fixed length. While these models generate gradual price-level adjustments that cause monetary shocks to have real effects, they may be criticized for giving firms little flexibility to adjust their pricing behavior after a dramatic shift in policy, such as the end of a hyperinflation. In particular, these models cannot successfully reconcile Sargent's observations with Gordon's.
Models with fixed costs of price adjustment avoid this criticism by allowing firms to adopt state-dependent strategies, changing their nominal prices whenever they deviate sufficiently from their target values. As noted above, however, these models are extremely difficult to solve. Thus, the analysis here combines elements of time-dependent and state-dependent pricing.
This combination, borrowed from Ball and Mankiw (1994) , gives firms the flexibility to adjust their prices, at some fixed cost, after a large monetary shock, while preserving the tractability of time-dependent specifications.
Section II presents the model, while sections III and IV explore its quantitative implications for the welfare costs and benefits of inflation and disinflation. Section V concludes by bringing the model's implications to bear on the questions first raised by Gordon and Sargent.
II. The Model
The model takes many of its features from those of Ball and Romer (1989) and Blanchard and Fischer (1989, Ch.8 The household chooses c (i), n (i), and s (i) for all ie[0,1) and t t t t=0,1,2,... to maximize its utility subject to its budget constraints. Its first-order conditions are
for all ie[0,1) and t=0,1,2,..., where l >0 is the multiplier on the budget t constraint for time t.
Following Ball and Romer (1989) , a simple quantity-theoretic equation determines the relationship between the nominal money supply M and nominal t expenditures on goods at time t:
One could derive a similar relationship by subjecting the household to a cash-in-advance constraint, requiring it to make its purchases of goods with money at each time t=0,1,2,.... In that case, however, inflation would act as a distortionary tax; as in Cooley and Hansen (1989) , the household would attempt to economize on its money balances by inefficiently substituting out of market activity and into leisure when faced with a positive inflation rate.
Equation (1) abstracts from the cost of this inflation tax; however, the conclusion briefly considers the implications of the alternative, cash-inadvance approach.
Combining the household's first-order conditions with (1) yields
defines the aggregate price level P at time t. Equation (2) This specification for the cost of price adjustment, taken from Ball and Mankiw (1994) , allows pricing strategies to be partially state-dependent, since each firm can change its price whenever it deviates sufficiently from its target value. Thus, firms have some flexibility to adjust their pricesetting behavior in response to a large shift in policy, such as an announced disinflation. Nevertheless, the specification retains the analytic tractability of models of time-dependent pricing by allowing each firm to change its price freely after a fixed number of periods. Thus, the specification combines the desirable features of both models of pricing.
In light of the linear production function and the requirement that firms sell output on demand, (3) implies that firm i's dividend at time t is
A firm that can freely choose a new price at time t has two options. It can adopt a single-price strategy, retaining the same price for t and t+1. In this case, it avoids paying the fixed cost k at t+1, but must sell output at a price that stays constant for two periods. Alternatively, it can adopt a twoprice strategy, charging different prices at t and t+1. In this case, it adjusts its price optimally between the two periods, but must pay the fixed cost k at t+1. Typically, therefore, firms will adopt single-price strategies under moderate rates of inflation, when the cost of retaining the same nominal price for two periods remains small, and switch to two-price strategies under higher rates of inflation, when it becomes worthwhile to pay the fixed cost k to avoid the larger cost of price rigidity.
If the firm adopts a single-price strategy, (6) and (7) imply that its choice of P (i) must maximize
In this case, therefore, firm i has
If, on the other hand, the firm adopts a two-price strategy, (6) and (7) imply that each P (i), j=0 and j=1, must maximize
t+j t+j t+j t+j t+j
By (6) and (7), firm i chooses the strategy that maximizes
where c (i)=0 if it follows (8) and c (i)=1 if it follows (9) and (10).
t+1 t+1
When solving this optimization problem, the firm takes the nominal money supply M , the aggregate price level P , and hence the aggregate level of real balances x as given. In equilibrium, however, x must be consistent with the
III. The Effects of Steady-State Inflation

A. Steady-State Conditions
When money growth is constant, with m =m for all t=0,1,2,. 
If, on the other hand, firm i adopts a two-price strategy in the steady state, (9) and (10) imply that it sets
Since half of all firms set new prices at t=0,2,4,..., and half of all firms set new prices at t=1,3,5,..., (11)- (13) imply that steady-state real balances are
if all firms adopt single-price strategies and
if all firms adopt two-price strategies. Equation (2) 
with x given by (14), if all firms adopt single-price strategies, and
if all firms adopt two-price strategies. Note that in the latter case, half of all firms incur the fixed cost of price adjustment at each t=0,1,2,..., so that employment exceeds output by k/2.
B. Model Parameterization
To see how output, employment, and welfare vary with steady-state inflation, one must begin by assigning values to the model's four parameters:
a, b, q, and k. Equations (9) and (10) show that a firm that resets its price * optimally in every period chooses P (i)=P (i) for all t=0,1,2,..., where
moderate rates of inflation, firms adjust their prices annually. The choice is therefore consistent with observations by Carlton (1986) , Cecchetti (1986) , Blinder (1994) , and Kashyap (1995) , which suggest that nominal prices in the United States economy are typically adjusted at intervals of one year or more.
The choice of period length also dictates a setting of b=0.975, which implies an annual discount rate of 5 percent.
The linear production function implies that the aggregate markup of price over marginal cost in this economy is simply P /W , the inverse of the t t real wage. Thus, (4) and (14) imply that under moderate rates of inflation,
where firms adopt single-price strategies, the steady-state markup is
When m is small, the second and third terms in this expression remain close to unity, so that the markup is approximately q/(q-1). Based on their review of empirical studies of the markup in the United States economy, Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) select a benchmark value of 1.2 for the steady-state markup; their choice, which implies q=6, is also used here.
Finally, the value of k determines the inflation rate at which firms abandon single-price strategies, so that the rigidity of individual goods prices disappears. Thus, k=0.0175 is selected here, so that all firms adopt two-price strategies when steady-state inflation reaches 198 percent annually.
Of course, this choice for k implies that significant price rigidities remain for annual inflation rates below 198 percent, but evidence presented by Mussa (1981) suggests that this may not be an unreasonable assumption: he finds that in early stages of the German hyperinflation of the 1920s, when inflation averaged 31 percent per month, some individual goods prices remained constant for periods of up to three months. Figure 1 plots the level of steady-state output c=x for annual inflation rates between zero and 250 percent. For inflation rates below 198 percent, all firms adopt single-price strategies, and output varies with inflation.
C. The Effects of Inflation on Output and Welfare
For inflation rates above 198 percent, firms use two-price strategies, so that nominal rigidities, and the effects of inflation on output, disappear.
When firms adopt single-price strategies, (14) reveals that inflation affects output through the second term,
which is decreasing in m, and the third term,
which is increasing in m. In fact, these two offsetting effects of inflation on output in this general equilibrium model are precisely those identified in partial equilibrium by Benabou and Konieczny (1994) .
The second term in (14) works to decrease output as inflation rises since, as shown by (11), this term also works to increase firm i's real price P (i)/M when it adopts a single-price strategy. As explained by Benabou and t t Konieczny, this effect results from an asymmetry in the firm's profit function.
Specifically, when firm i adopts a single-price strategy, (11) and (16) show that the real price P (i)/M initially lies above its optimal value t t * P (i)/M ; later, inflation erodes the real price, so that P (i)/M lies t t t+1 t+1 * below P (i)/M . Equation (7), meanwhile, shows that the real value of t+1 t+1 a firm i's profits at time t, given by x D (i)/M , can be written as a function 
D. Multiple Equilibria
For some inflation rates, the steady states described in figures 1 and 2 fail to be unique. In these cases, there exist three steady states: one in which all firms adopt single-price strategies, one in which all firms adopt two-price strategies, and one in which a fraction of all firms adopt singleprice strategies while the remaining firms adopt two-price strategies.
When firm i adopts a single-price strategy, its fixed nominal price * deviates from the optimal value P (i). The loss in profits resulting from the firm's incentive to use a two-price strategy strengthens as x rises. In addition, from (11)- (13), output is given by 
IV. The Effects of Disinflation on Output and Welfare
The effects of disinflation can be analyzed in this perfect foresight model, following Phelps (1979) , Taylor (1983 ), Fischer (1986 , and Danziger at t=-1 unless it pays the fixed cost k. Thus, if the change in policy calls for a reduction in money growth, it may be accompanied by short-run losses in aggregate output.
The algorithm used here to compute the effects of disinflation finds the equilibrium in which the fewest costly price changes occur. Thus, in cases where multiple equilibria exist, the ones discussed below are those that feature the slowest rate of price-level adjustment and hence the largest output effects; this approach focuses on equilibria in which the problem of disinflation is most severe. Figure 3 shows the output effects of a policy that brings money growth to an immediate halt when the initial annual steady-state inflation rate is 3
percent, approximately equal to the rate of core consumer price inflation in the United States from 1993 through 1995. This change in policy is too small to induce firms to immediately change their prices; hence, output falls nearly 1.5 percent at t=0. Furthermore, as in Danziger (1988) , the first firms to respond to the disinflation actually raise their nominal prices; each firm ie[1/2,1) adjusts its price upwards at t=1, so that output falls still further. Thereafter, the staggered price-setting structure causes the decline in output to persist, as in Ball and Romer (1989) and Blanchard and Fischer (1989, Ch.8 ). Output does not return to its initial steady-state level until 3 1/2 years after the change in policy.
Eventually, however, output rises to its new steady-state level under zero inflation, which is 0.070 percent higher than under 3 percent inflation.
This long-run output gain, although small, suffices to offset the costs of the short-run output loss, so that the immediate disinflation is welfare-improving relative to the initial policy of continuing 3 percent inflation. For the parameter values used here, in fact, an immediate disinflation yields a welfare gain starting from any annual inflation rate above 2.7 percent.
To illustrate the effects of a more gradual approach to disinflation, figure 4 displays the effects of policies that reduce money growth linearly over T periods. These policies set
for t=0,1,...,T-1, where m =m is the initial rate of inflation, and losses. When T=6, so that money growth is reduced to zero over a three-year period, the initial output decline is only 0.24 percent. When T=17, the initial output decline is just 0.086 percent.
In fact, both of the gradual disinflations considered in figure 4 actually allow output to rise above its new steady-state level for a period of time. Ball (1994) shows that in models of staggered price setting, the aggregate price level at time t can be approximated by a weighted average of past and future money supplies. When disinflation proceeds slowly, the gradual decline in money growth makes the money supply a concave function of time. Hence, the price level, as an average of past and future money supplies, falls relative to the current money supply. Real balances, and hence aggregate output, rise.
Thus, figures 3 and 4 corroborate Gordon's (1982) conclusions: starting from a moderate inflation rate, a rapid disinflation yields short-run output losses, but these losses can be minimized by ending inflation more gradually.
Starting from higher inflation rates, however, Sargent's (1982) views apply. Overall, the curve in figure 6 slopes downward. Starting from an annual inflation rate of 1 percent, the best linear disinflation takes 15 1/2 years to complete, so that T=31 is optimal. Starting from 3 percent inflation, the best disinflation takes 8 1/2 years, so that T=17 as in figure 4. All inflations exceeding 136 percent annually are best ended at once. The curve is not entirely monotonic, however; the gain from a more gradual approach works to increase the optimal length of disinflation as the initial annual inflation rate rises from 79 to 135 percent. Figure 6 shows, therefore, that while small inflations are best ended gradually and big inflations are best ended immediately, the optimal speed of disinflation is not always increasing in the initial inflation rate, at least within the class of linear disinflations considered here. For every initial inflation rate, however, the optimal disinflation shown in figure 6 yields a welfare gain relative to the policy of continuing inflation: stopping inflation is always worthwhile.
V. Conclusion
Gordon (1982) and Sargent (1982) The analysis shows that, indeed, the best disinflations are gradual when the initial inflation is small and more rapid when the initial inflation is big. But while this prescription applies fairly generally, there are exceptions: over some ranges, the optimal speed of disinflation decreases with the initial inflation rate. Across all of the examples considered, however, stopping an inflation, big or small, turns out to be welfare-improving.
The model developed here is detailed enough to provide quantitative answers to the two questions raised by Gordon and Sargent's studies: how does the cost of disinflation depend on the initial inflation rate, and how does it depend on the speed of disinflation? Nevertheless, the model remains stylized along some dimensions, leaving room for extensions in future work. The model abstracts from the process of capital accumulation, for instance, and although they are given more flexibility here than in previous work on disinflation, firms are constrained to set prices either once or twice per year. In pursuing these extensions, however, the basic specification used here may prove useful. This specification, borrowed from Ball and Mankiw (1994) , combines elements of time-dependent and state-dependent models to allow firms to change their pricing behavior after a large shock while still retaining the tractability needed to consider a wide range of alternative monetary policies.
There are, in addition, two other dimensions along which the model presented here can be modified or extended, both of which would yield important changes in the results. The first concerns the way in which money is introduced into the model. Here, money and nominal output are linked by the simple quantity-theoretic equation (1). If, instead, money were introduced through a cash-in-advance constraint, as in Cooley and Hansen (1989) , inflation would act as a distortionary tax; the representative household would be given an incentive to economize on its money balances by inefficiently substituting out of market activity and into leisure when faced with a positive inflation rate. Eliminating these effects of the inflation tax would yield additional benefits of disinflation. In fact, Ireland (1995) shows that these additional benefits are large enough to outweigh any shortrun output costs, so that even starting from a low rate of inflation, a very rapid disinflation becomes optimal in the cash-in-advance case.
Second, Sargent (1986) criticizes the gradual approach to disinflation advocated by Gordon (1982) and prescribed by this model for low initial inflation rates, arguing that such policies are likely to be regarded with skepticism by the public. Here, any announced disinflationary policy, however gradual, is taken as fully credible by private agents, who immediately begin acting without concern that the change in policy will be reversed. If gradual policies lack credibility, however, the effects of uncertainty about future reversals will be incorporated into firms' pricing behavior, making disinflation more costly. Thus, Ireland (1995) also considers the effects of imperfect credibility in a model of disinflation with time-dependent pricing and finds that, in the absence of full credibility, the optimal policy calls for a more rapid decrease in money growth.
To the extent that the inflation-tax effects emphasized by Cooley and Hansen (1989) and the credibility effects emphasized by Sargent (1986) play important roles, therefore, the optimal disinflationary policies will be less gradual than those prescribed here.
